The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict by Autesserre, Severine
When, in 2006, Joseph Kabila became the first democratically
elected president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, many
Congolese and international observers hoped that stability had finally
come to the country. During the previous decade, Congo had been
ravaged by widespread violence, including the world’s deadliest conflict
since World War II—a conflict that involved three Congolese rebel
movements, 14 foreign armed groups, and countless militias; killed
over 3.3 million Congolese; and destabilized most of central Africa.
In 2001, the United Nations dispatched to the country what was to
become its largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission. A peace
settlement was reached in 2003, paving the way for the 2006 elections.
The entire eªort was touted as an example of a successful international
intervention in a collapsing state.
Yet over two million more Congolese have died since the o⁄cial
end of the war. According to the International Rescue Committee,
over a thousand civilians continue to die in Congo every day, mostly
due to malnutrition and diseases that could be easily prevented if
Congo’s already weak economic and social structures had not collapsed
during the conflict. In mid-2007, in the eastern province of Nord-Kivu,
low-level fighting between government forces and troops of the renegade
Tutsi general Laurent Nkunda escalated into a major confrontation,
both playing oª and exacerbating long-standing animosity between
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the Tutsis, the Hutus, and other groups. Since then, clashes have killed
hundreds, maybe thousands, of fighters and civilians and forced half
a million people to relocate. Congo is now the stage for the largest
humanitarian disaster in the world—far larger than the crisis in Sudan.
The international community has admittedly been facing a very
complex situation: all the parties have legitimate grievances, but all
are also responsible for massive human rights violations; the fighting
involves many armed groups, and these often fragment and shift
alliances. Still, the main reason that the peace-building strategy in
Congo has failed is that the international community has paid too little
attention to the root causes of the violence there: local disputes over
land and power. If anything, international eªorts to bring peace have
enhanced local tensions.While it focused on organizing the presidential,
legislative, and provincial elections of 2006, the international community
overlooked other critical postconflict tasks, such as local peace building
and overhauling the justice system. Meanwhile, the electoral process
fueled ethnic hatred and marginalized ethnic minorities, making the
reemergence of armed movements all the more likely.
The international community must fundamentally revise its strategy.
It must focus on local antagonisms, because they often cause or fuel
broader tensions, and regional and national actors hijack local agendas
to serve their own ends. Until the local grievances that are feeding the
violence throughout eastern Congo are addressed, security in the entire
country and the Great Lakes region overall will remain uncertain.
your land is my land
Tensions at the levels of the individual, the family, the clan, the
village, and the district are a critical source of instability and violence
in Congo. Control over land, especially, has historically been a major
bone of contention in rural areas because the stakes are high and the
interested parties numerous. Land matters because for many people
it is the key to survival and feeding one’s family. For many more, it is
both a primary method of gaining the social capital needed to integrate
local structures and a means of securing natural resources.
In the territories of Masisi and Walikale, in Nord-Kivu, diªerent
ethnic groups, clans, and families are fighting over competing claims.
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There are centuries-old antagonisms among native Congolese com-
munities, such as the Hundes, the Nandes, and the Nyangas. But the
fiercest disputes oppose them to Congolese of Rwandan descent. In
the early part of the twentieth century, Belgian colonial administrators
relocated over 85,000 people, both Hutu and Tutsi, from overpopulated
Rwanda to the sparse Kivu provinces in Congo, and in the 1960s and
1970s various waves of Tutsis fled there to escape pogroms in Rwanda.
Today, Congolese of Rwandan descent, especially the Tutsis among
them, own most of the land, but the Hundes and the Nyangas continue
to claim it as their own on the grounds that it was never rightfully sold
or given away.
These competing claims have gotten far more complicated since
the 1990s, as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and various wars, invasions,
and refugee movements caused multiple
shifts in the ownership or control of land
in the Kivus. Many Tutsis in the region, in
particular, whether Congolese or Rwandan,
have fled prosecution several times over the
past decade, abandoning their plots or selling
them at a discount and then claiming them
back again, sometimes by force,on their return.
The provincial authorities have resolved some
of these disputes since the peace deal in 2003, but land ownership is
at the core of the current fighting in Nord-Kivu. Throughout eastern
Congo, historical grievances of this kind also fuel battles between
(and within) dozens of mini factions from diªerent tribes, clans, and
families—such as the Hemas and the Lendus in Ituri, in the eastern
part of the province of Orientale, and the Bembes, the Holoholos, and
the Kalangas in northern Katanga—and greatly impede the peaceful
return of refugees and displaced persons.
Control over land is also a ticket to natural resources. Congo has
massive reserves of gold and diamonds, most of the world’s columbo-
tantalite and cassiterite (essential materials for most electronic
equipment), and many deposits of rare minerals. Since the end of the
war, most of the local ethnic militias in northern Katanga, which are
known as the Mai Mai, have regrouped around mining sites through-
out the region and fought among themselves or against soldiers of the
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national army for their control. In 2005, in the town of Shabunda, in
Sud-Kivu, soldiers pitted persons with competing claims over mineral-
rich areas against one another and then disarmed them when small-scale
violence broke out—only to exploit the concessions for themselves or
hand them over to third parties. Provincial and national commanders
were reportedly bribed into looking the other way.
In most cases, economic tensions feed politically motivated hostilities,
and vice versa. Access to resources means the ability to buy arms and
reward troops, and thus to secure political power; political power, in
turn, guarantees access to land and resources.Tensions between the so-
called indigenous communities and people of Rwandan descent (who
are often still considered immigrants even though many of them have
lived in Congo for generations) also influence claims over political
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representation. In Nord-Kivu, the Hutus and the Nandes, the province’s
two largest ethnic groups, have fought each other over control of
provincial politics. Factionalism and shifting alliances complicate
matters further. In each village, diªerent members of the same fam-
ily or diªerent branches of the same clan compete to be designated
chief under traditional law. In 2002, Hunde and Nyanga elites fought
large-scale battles for control of the town of Pinga, in Nord-Kivu.
Hutus and Tutsis of Rwandan ancestry, who had combated indige-
nous groups together during the late 1990s and early 2000s, split apart
in 2006,after a law confirmed that most of the Hutus among them were
also Congolese citizens, with rights to land ownership and political
representation, thus making the alliance less important to them. Since
then, they have tried to partner with the Nandes, who won leadership
of Nord-Kivu in the 2006 elections. As a result of this shift, the
province’s Tutsis have lost hope of gaining political representation
and become both more marginalized and more radicalized.
the circles of hell
For decades, these local tensions have also fueled broader struggles
at the regional and national levels—and, at times, the other way
around. Both Congolese and foreign politicians have long manip-
ulated local leaders and fragmented militias to enrich themselves,
advance their careers, or rally support for their causes. Local actors
have also recruited national allies. For example, in 1963, three years
after Congo’s independence, tensions over access to land and repre-
sentation in local administrations in Nord-Kivu led to tremendous
violence between the “indigenous” groups and the “immigrant” ones.
To undermine the “immigrants’” claims over land, the “indigenous”
communities contested their Congolese nationality; the “immigrants”
then turned to national politics for an alternative strategy. They
won the backing of then President Mobutu Sese Seko, who favored
promoting ethnic minorities because they could help him govern
without threatening his regime. Several people of Rwandan descent
thus got top political positions, which they leveraged to help other
people of Rwandan descent increase their own economic, political,
and social power, notably in the Kivus. Still, in the early 1980s, the
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“indigenous” lobby managed to get a law passed denying “immigrants”
Congolese citizenship. The measure was not implemented, but it
jeopardized the political and economic status of people of Rwandan
descent and strongly reinforced their fear of disenfranchisement.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, tensions over land and power caused
frequent skirmishes in Nord-Kivu.
These problems exploded in the 1990s, this time with a regional
dimension. In 1994, following the genocide in Rwanda and the Tutsis’
subsequent rise to power in Kigali, one million Rwandan Hutu refugees,
including many militia members, flowed into the Kivus, bringing
with them raw rivalries from home. Indigenous Congolese groups of
all stripes organized themselves into Mai Mai forces, and many allied
themselves with the defeated Rwandan Hutus, who were thankful
for any support that would help them survive in Congo’s jungle and for
access to mining resources and thus a means to buy arms.The interests
of Paul Kagame’s newly empowered Tutsi government in Rwanda
converged with those of the Congolese Tutsis. Both sides originally
intended merely to protect their kinsfolk, but they quickly started using
their military might to seize land or capture political power.
The fighting in the Kivus quickly evolved into a full-scale regional
and national war. In 1996, the growing unpopularity of the Mobutu
regime among Congo’s neighboring countries, as well as in the West,
prompted the formation of an alliance among a Congolese rebel group
with many members of Rwandan descent; the governments of Rwanda,
Burundi, Angola, and Uganda; and southern Sudanese rebels. Within
a year, the coalition overthrew Mobutu and replaced him with its
spokesperson,Laurent Kabila.When the Rwandan army invaded Congo
to support the rebellion, it had two basic objectives: hunting down
Rwandan Hutu rebels in the Kivus and protecting the Congolese
of Rwandan ancestry there. It soon developed a third: exploiting
Congo’s mineral resources.
Once in power, Kabila quickly turned on his former allies. He fired
his Rwandan advisers, ended Congo’s military cooperation with
Rwanda, and began inciting the population to racial hatred toward
Rwandans and Congolese of Rwandan ancestry. With these groups
feeling increasingly threatened, in 1998 the governments of Rwanda,
Burundi, and Uganda helped engineer a new rebel movement led
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by Congolese Tutsis. This alliance was less successful than that of
1996 because it met with opposition from the governments of Angola,
Namibia, and Zimbabwe, which sided
with Kabila. The conflict quickly turned
into a stalemate, with a fierce guerrilla war
raging in the eastern provinces. Kabila
managed to contain Rwanda and its allies
for several years thanks to local proxies, the
Mai Mai and Rwandan Hutu militias. In
the meantime, however, people of Rwandan
descent and Rwandan elites developed lu-
crative networks for tra⁄cking resources.
The Rwandan army o⁄cially withdrew from
eastern Congo after the peace deal in 2003,
but part of the Rwandan establishment has continued to uno⁄cially
provide financial, logistical, and military support to Congolese fighters
of Rwandan origin there.
Over the past few years, these long-standing local disputes in
eastern Congo have also been exacerbated by political developments
at the national level. For example, many experts argue that Hema
and Lendu factions from Ituri have been violently asserting them-
selves partly in reaction to their having been excluded from the
lengthy peace process that ended the last war in 2003. Similarly, the
highly selective fashion in which national actors picked Mai Mai
representatives to the transitional assembly that ran the country
until the 2006 elections created widespread infighting among Mai
Mai forces in the Kivus and northern Katanga.
These tensions could have been managed peacefully, but the
1998–2003 war destroyed the existing institutional means to do so.
Congo’s justice system has collapsed, like much of the state at large.
The war dislocated many communities, disrupting the operation of
traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms. The government’s all-
around poor performance, especially its failure to reestablish the
rule of law in the eastern provinces, has perpetuated a culture of
impunity, which has facilitated the use of violence, and the wide-
spread availability of small arms has made force an easily accessible
option for almost anybody.The national security forces cannot be relied
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on to maintain stability, because the utter lack of economic development
in the eastern provinces means that belonging to an armed group is one
of few profitable occupations.
Today, most of the Mai Mai in Nord-Kivu remain allied to Rwandan
Hutu militias, support President Joseph Kabila (the son of and im-
mediate successor to Laurent Kabila, who died in 2001), and continue
to oppose the armed Tutsi groups—all because doing so is still the
best way for them to consolidate their claims to ancestral land rights
and positions of authority. The Tutsis, for their part, have recently
rallied around Nkunda, who belonged to the Rwanda-backed rebel
movement that fought the Congolese government during the last
war. He refuses to disarm and integrate his troops into the national
army in order to better protect his ethnic community, which he believes
is once again threatened by various local and national Congolese
groups. In keeping with Congo’s history since independence, the
dispute between the Mai Mai and the Tutsis has a regional dimension,
too: Nkunda is said to be recruiting fighters and obtaining arms
from Rwanda.
Thus, for much of the 1990s and early years of this century, local
tensions in the Kivus have repeatedly prompted outbreaks of ethnic
violence, with so-called indigenous groups forming alliances with
Rwandan Hutu militias and, in response, the Rwandan government
supporting Congolese fighters of Rwandan ancestry and intervening
in the name of national security. And the situation, which shows that
local troubles in eastern Congo jeopardize the entire country’s stability,
is consistent with recent academic research about civil wars. The Yale
political scientist Stathis Kalyvas, among other scholars, has shown
how in many conflict environments, land disputes, social antagonisms,
professional jealousies, family feuds, and romantic rivalries become
the fodder for tensions at the regional and national levels. Local leaders
learn to couch their feuds in the rhetoric that dominates the national
discourse—be it about ideology, ethnicity, religion, or class—in order to
enlist support from government actors. Conversely, national politicians
use local players to find the recruits, resources, and information they
need to pursue their own objectives. Local violence may be fueled
by regional and national antagonisms, but it is above all motivated by
distinctively local tensions.
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seeing the trees for the forest
Distinctively local agendas motivate a large part of the ongoing
violence in Congo, yet diplomats, un o⁄cials, and journalists have
focused almost exclusively on the regional and national problems.
To ease economic and security tensions between Congolese and
Rwandan actors, for example, diplomats and un o⁄cials have organized
numerous dialogues and conferences in the region and elsewhere,
including some with the Congolese, Rwandan, Burundian, and
Ugandan governments to discuss their support for various rebel groups,
the repatriation of Congolese refugees, and developing a code for the
exploitation of Congo’s natural resources. In times of crises, the un
leadership and African and Western states, such as South Africa, the
United States, and European Union countries, have put pressure on
the Rwandan government, in some cases by threatening to withdraw
international aid, in order to prevent it from invading Congo again.
After the 2003 peace agreement, former warlords were continuing to
fight one another politically and militarily, while Congolese military
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leaders at all levels were diverting funds destined for the national army.
African and Western diplomats from the 15 states and organizations
involved in Congo’s postconflict transition endeavored to convince
the warlords to integrate their soldiers into the army, supervised the
disbursement of soldiers’ pay to prevent the diversion of funds, and
trained a few integrated brigades.
But this eªort overlooked the critical fact that today local conflicts
are driving the broader conflicts, not the other way around—and with
counterproductive eªects.Most notably, the international community’s
insistence on organizing elections in 2006 has ended up jeopardizing
the peace. There was no outbreak of violence on the day of the polls;
many Congolese were enthusiastic about voting for the first time in
their lives. But the elections cemented Kabila’s strongman government,
which is bent on harassing the opposition and carrying on Mobutu’s
legacy of corruption—two destabilizing factors. The election process
itself was also damaging. After the calm that immediately followed
the voting, many provinces experienced renewed tensions along ethnic
lines because of candidates who had propagated hatred during their
campaigns in order to boost their popularity.The campaign was marred
by major intimidation and fraud, which significantly tipped the balance
of power at the provincial level. In Bas-Congo and Kasai-Oriental,
the contest further marginalized minorities.The Tutsis of Nord-Kivu
could not get any representatives into the provincial assembly because
some 40,000 of them are refugees in Rwanda and cannot vote. The
National Assembly, moreover, now counts many radicals bent on
cleansing Congo of people of Rwandan descent.The Tutsi minority’s
renewed fears that an ethnic-cleansing campaign may be in the o⁄ng
was a major reason for Nkunda’s popularity late last year and, indirectly,
for the renewed fighting in Nord-Kivu.
Instead of focusing solely on large-scale peacekeeping and elections,
the international community should have also taken on other critical
postconflict tasks, such as institution building.But since 2003,diplomats
and un o⁄cials have left it up to Congolese authorities, Congolese
religious leaders, and nongovernmental organizations (ngos) to conduct
bottom-up peace-building work. And with only a few exceptions,
Congolese authorities and religious leaders have been unable or
unwilling to conduct peace building locally—when they have not been
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involved in fueling the violence outright. A handful of ngos, Congolese
and international, have implemented local conflict-resolution projects,
but their numbers have been too few, and they have faced too many
challenges to make much of a diªerence.
The un-led peace process also did almost nothing to promote
good governance or reinforce Kinshasa’s administrative hold on the
eastern provinces. This was a major flaw, because the reestablishment
of the rule of law could have deterred some human rights abuses,assuaged
resentment over past communal violence, and brought to all Congolese
a level of personal and material security that might have lessened their
dependence on armed groups. Instead, rivalries were left to fester.
The result, besides a return to major violence, has been the worsening
of the underlying problems. The conflicts have become increasingly
decentralized, and the parties have fragmented—meaning that the
basic issues have become even more localized than before. Journalists
and policymakers often talk of the Rwandan Hutu militias, Tutsi
dissidents, and the Mai Mai as if these were
coherent groups, but none has a unified com-
mand structure. In the past several years, the
Rwandan Hutu militias have increasingly
fractured;now, factions fight one another over
the spoils of looting, leadership antagonisms,
and whether to return to Rwanda. Subgroups
among the Tutsis in the Kivus have distinct and
sometimes inconsistent agendas. Although
the Tutsis in Nord-Kivu are currently aligned
with Nkunda, relations between them can be
tense. In Sud-Kivu, the Tutsis are divided between rich and poor
clans,with the rich reportedly supporting the local dissidents sometimes
called the Group of 47 and the poor backing the Kabila government.
Meanwhile, there is no hierarchy controlling the Mai Mai, not nation-
ally and sometimes not even within a single city. Some Mai Mai
groups are allied with government troops (especially in Nord-Kivu),
but others are fighting against them and among themselves (especially
in Sud-Kivu and northern Katanga). The factions are so subdivided
that many brigade commanders do not control their own battalion
commanders. Even the national army cannot rein in its soldiers; both
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o⁄cers and members of the rank and file regularly loot, rape, and
commit other human rights violations or strike deals with the militias
they are ostensibly fighting in order to gain access to resources.
thinking local, acting local
Given the recent clashes, it is clear that more work is urgently
needed to deal with the violence at the regional and national levels.
Western and African governments must intensify diplomatic pres-
sure on the Kabila government and on Nkunda in order to stop the
fighting immediately. Disbursing more humanitarian and development
aid would help prevent many deaths by providing much-needed
medical and nutritional assistance, which the Congolese health system
cannot do. The un Security Council should request that the un use
its peacekeeping troops to protect those populations in immediate
danger rather than focusing on protecting un buildings and equipment.
And the U.S. government must drastically change its Rwanda policy,
threatening to sanction Kigali unless it prevents cross-border activities
in support of Nkunda.
But far more important, international actors must radically rethink
their peace-building strategy if they want to accomplish more than yet
another temporary cease-fire. Since 2003, most diplomats and un staª
members have been held back from getting involved at the local level
by four widespread assumptions: they have treated Congo as a post-
conflict situation, they have assumed that violence is pervasive through-
out the country, they have relegated intervention to the national and
international realms, and they have acted as though holding elections
is an eªective tool of peace and state building. In fact, Congo today is
in the midst of a civil war, violence is not a normal feature of life there,
local peace building is a legitimate task for international actors, and
elections do little to stabilize countries or build institutions, and they
sometimes hurt.Treating only the consequences of the ongoing conflict
without addressing its underlying causes is absurd; the situation in
Congo must be approached from the bottom up.
The very first priority must be resolving land disputes in eastern
Congo. For starters, the Congolese government must enact new land
legislation that upholds the rights of vulnerable people (such as women,
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minorities, and returnees) and clarifies exactly when and how legal or
traditional ownership rights apply. Throughout the country, but
especially in the eastern provinces, the new legislation must mandate
a review of all land property deeds. Local ngos and judicial employees
must be sent to rural areas to explain property law to the population
there, which generally knows little of its rights.The new law must also
include a special provision for resource-rich lands.Mining contracts for
Katanga and Kasai-Oriental, among other places, are currently being
reviewed; the process must be extended to all of Congo, especially to
the Kivus and Ituri, where control over resources is an especially
volatile issue.
Land reform must also establish formal mechanisms for resolving
disputes through the local courts, to be staªed with both judicial
employees and representatives of the aªected communities, or through
ad hoc arrangements. Whenever necessary to ensure fairness or
prevent creating new resentments, people whose property is being
taken away should be compensated with money or in kind. For example,
the beneficiaries of redistribution could be required to help the former
owners build another house or to share their harvest with them. All
adjudications should be handled free of charge so that the most dis-
enfranchised people have a chance to claim what is theirs.
In areas where many families, clans, or ethnic groups are deprived
of the land they need to survive (such as in Masisi, in Nord-Kivu, or
Kabare, in Sud-Kivu), the new legislation must also create provincial
commissions to design a fair redistribution policy. These should
include representatives from every local community and social group,
Congolese experts on land issues, and neutral observers. They should
focus on redressing injustices and on finding sustainable solutions. As
the International Crisis Group suggests, for example, in the territories
of Masisi and Walikale, in Nord-Kivu, such a commission should
cancel all the title deeds for estates and ranches issued since Congo’s
independence. It should also compensate the former owners of ex-
propriated land and assign some of it to landless families (notably
among the Hundes, the Hutus, the Nyangas, and the Tutsis, who
are the main groups living in Masisi and Walikale) for individual or
collective use based on whether it is fit for agriculture or animal graz-
ing. Broad land reforms such as these would prevent new disputes,
Séverine Autesserre
[ 106 ] foreign affairs . Volume 87 No. 3
improve intercommunal relations, and help extend state authority to
the mining sites in the region. It would also go some way toward
ensuring that the return of Tutsi refugees to the Kivus does not trigger
another major crisis.
It is important that these eªorts target all the communities in the
Kivus,not just the population with Rwandan ancestry and its traditional
enemies. Even more broadly, it is also important that all local actors
have a chance to air and resolve their grievances, be they about land,
sharing traditional and administrative power, or anything else. To
ensure a lasting peace, ngos should help recreate social links between
communities in conflict. The most eªective strategy is to create enter-
prises, health centers, markets, and schools in whose success all the
parties have a stake. A similar approach has worked in parts of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Tajikistan. Combined with land
reform, such a broad reconciliation program could help stem violence,
address most of the grievances that gave rise to the Mai Mai, shrink
the pool of local recruits for regional and national warlords, reintegrate
refugees and displaced persons, and start rebuilding state institutions.
the support group
Ideally, the Congolese would lead these initiatives. But the gov-
ernment in Kinshasa is weak and corrupt, and Congolese ngos and
civil-society representatives often lack the funding, logistical means,
and technical capacity to implement eªective peace-building programs.
International actors can help, but only if they make resolving local
conflicts a top priority instead of concentrating only on humanitarian
programs or macro issues such as elections (as most groups currently
based in the eastern provinces are doing). Diplomats and un staªers
have little experience developing and implementing comprehensive
programs addressing local violence. They should urgently build up
their capacity by hiring experts on Congo and Rwanda and local conflict
resolution, sharing those specialists’ knowledge with all existing staª,
and creating specialized o⁄ces or departments in these areas.
Since last year, international actors have taken tiny steps in the right
direction. The United States and the United Kingdom have opened
consulates in Goma, the capital of Nord-Kivu. The un peacekeeping
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mission in Congo (known by its French acronym monuc) redeployed
troops to the eastern provinces, mostly to Nord-Kivu, and is setting
up buªer zones to separate the main combatant groups. The few
existing ngos that focused on local conflict resolution in the region
are more active than ever. The ngo Initiative pour un Leadership
Cohésif en rdc, for example, has organized several workshops with
local and national elites in order to help them work out their diªer-
ences, and the Life and Peace Institute has intensified the funding, as
well as the teaching and logistical support, it gives to those Congolese
ngos that do the best work promoting conflict resolution in the Kivus.
But this is not enough.Furthermore, even well-intentioned initiatives
are often ill conceived. In January 2008, for example, the Congolese
government, with strong diplomatic and
un support, organized a peace conference
in Goma to find a solution to the specific
problems of the Kivus. Participants did have
a chance to discuss their grievances over
local political power, land expropriation, and
mining resources, but these topics were not
a priority.The conference focused instead on
neutralizing the most prominent warlords,
such as Nkunda and the major Mai Mai
chiefs. A cease-fire agreement was signed.
But the gathering’s main accomplishment, a
nonbinding “act of engagement,” proposed no concrete solutions
for local antagonisms. And the fighting never stopped, not even
during the conference.
Donors would do better to expand the funding available for local
conflict resolution by increasing their aid budgets or shifting their
assistance priorities away from elections.They should focus on helping
the Congolese government and representatives from all the eastern
communities work on land reform and the review of mining contracts
by providing independent experts on land and judicial matters. Donors
should also fund the training of local Congolese ngos and justice o⁄cials
so that they can be deployed as observers to the land-redistribution
commissions or sent to villages to educate the rural population. And
they should provide the ngos with the funds to compensate the parties
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who will lose land.To ensure that any additional money goes to e⁄cient
programs, donors should ask the experts on local conflict resolution
and the specialists on Congo and Rwanda in their consulates to identify
reliable local peace builders in the eastern provinces. They should
oªer financial support to the Congolese ngos that organize peace
talks and reconciliation programs, such as Plate-forme des Associations
de Développement de Bunyakiri, which brings together military,
political, business, and ethnic elites of the territory of Bunyakiri, in
Sud-Kivu, and Arche d’Alliance, which helps victims of human rights
violations in Sud-Kivu and promotes the reform of existing human
rights legislation.
Monuc has an important supporting role to play. Although some
of its troops have been involved in resource tra⁄cking, sexual violence,
and some brutal joint operations with Congolese army personnel, the
force’s presence has had a positive impact overall. If nothing else, it
has so far prevented the conflict in Nord-Kivu from escalating into a
regional or national war. Going forward, monuc should start working
on resolving local conflicts and distributing its resources diªerently
than it does now. (New directives from the un’s Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and monuc’s leadership would allow for this,
but a Security Council resolution emphasizing the dangers of local
tensions and monuc’s responsibility in local peace building is prefer-
able, as it would help overcome any resistance by un staªers on the
ground.) In the eastern provinces, monuc should deploy more military
police and special operations forces and fewer traditional troops,
because the former are better trained for action at the local level,
especially in logistically di⁄cult environments. In their daily work,
military and civilian un staªers should help provincial authorities
develop the capacity to oversee the exploitation of mining sites. In
addition, monuc should recruit well-trained local-peace building
o⁄cials for deployment in the eastern provinces, downsizing its staª
in Kinshasa if necessary. Monuc should also send civilian staªers
with the authority to draw on military, diplomatic, or development
resources to monitor local tensions and suggest how best to broker
peace.The existing Congolese ngos are ill equipped to address the local
tensions caused by military antagonisms or manipulated by regional
and national actors, and so international donors and un agencies should
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step in to assist them. Such interventions would help address the
broader dimensions of the violence by both deterring local warlords
and oªering them the possibility of development assistance.
In the long term, local peace will be sustainable only if the
Congolese state is stable and its institutions are built up at all levels.
To that end, the Congolese government must develop ways to inte-
grate all the armed groups, including Nkunda’s troops and the Mai
Mai, into the national army; rebuild its justice system (an essential
step toward ending impunity and thus deterring violence, assuaging
communal resentment, and promoting good governance); and solve
the security problem posed by the Rwandan Hutu militias (by reset-
tling those Rwandan Hutus who are not guilty of war crimes and
launching a campaign with monuc to capture any perpetrators of
atrocities on the Congolese population and the few Rwandans guilty
of genocide still present in the Kivus). These would be extremely
di⁄cult tasks anywhere, and Congo, with its weak state, fragmented
political arena, refugee flows, and poor infrastructure, is a particularly
challenging environment. But with over a thousand people still dying
there every day and the Kivus in the midst of a conflict that could
easily engulf the Great Lakes region again, something must be done.
The best approach is to make a priority of treating core problems at
the local level, especially long-standing land disputes, rather than
focusing exclusively on managing their broader consequences. When
it comes to Congo, international actors should work, quite literally,
from the ground up.∂
